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Executive Summary
In 1978, the water cleaning system for the KE Basin was upgraded by adding a sand filter and ion exchange columns. Basin water containing finely divided solids is collected by three surface skimmers and pumped to the sand filter. Filtrate from the sand filter is further treated in the ion exchange modules. The suspended solids accumulate in the sand until the pressure drop across the filter reaches established operating limits, at which time the sand filter is backwashed. The backwash is collected in the north loadout pit (NLOP), where the solids are allowed to settle as sludge. Figure 2 -1 shows a basic piping and instrumentation diagram depicting the relationship among the basin skimmers, sand filter, and NLOP.
During the course of deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of the K-Basins, the sand filter and its media will need to be dispositioned. The isotopic distribution of the sludge in the sand filter has been estimated in KE Basin Sand Filter Monolith DQO (KBC-24705) . This document estimates the sand filter contribution to the KE hazard categorization using the data from the DQO.
The initial hazard category contribution of the KE Basin sand filter is Hazard Category 3. However, DOE-STD-1027-92 specifies that the final hazard categorization for a facility can consider the dispersibility of the radioactive inventory. This is done by adjusting the threshold quantity values for each radionuclide up or down based on the form and dispersibility of the inventory compared to assumptions made in determination of the DOE-STD-1027-92 threshold quantity values. To provide the basis for the final hazard categorization, a hazard analysis of D&D activities and inventories was done to identify bounding unmitigated accidents that could result in the dispersal of the radioactive material from within the basin facility. The final hazard category determinations reported here in Table ES-1 consider airborne release fractions, respirable fractions, and damage ratios based on bounding unmitigated accidents for D&D activities. 
Purpose
During the course of deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of the K-Basins, the KE Basin sand filter will need to be dispositioned. The radionuclide content of the sand filter and its potential dispersibility will determine the contribution of the sand filter to the overall KE Basin hazard categorization. This document calculates the contribution of the KE sand filter to the KE Basin hazard categorization using the Sand Filter Monolith Data Quality Objectives (DQO). Also, the potential radiological consequence of an accident involving the sand filter media is discussed to provide perspective for the hazard categorization results.
Scope
The sand filter hazard categorization is based on the KE Basin Sand Filter Monolith DQO (KBC-24705, Rev. 0) . Both a seismic induced facility fire and a spray release accident were considered for the adjustment of the radionuclide inventories for final hazard categorization contribution of the sand filter. The final hazard categorization is based on consideration of airborne release fractions (ARFs), respirable fractions (RFs), and damage ratios (DRs) for the bounding unmitigated accidents.
Hazard Categorization Methods

Initial Hazard Categorization
The initial hazard categorization for the sand filter is based on comparing the total radionuclide inventory quantity in the sand filter from the various data sources to hazard category threshold quantities. ) of all the radionuclide quantities from each inventory source to the category threshold quantities are summed and the result is compared to 1.0. HC-3 ratios of greater than 1.0 combined with HC-2 ratios of less than 1.0 indicate that the sand filter inventory is initially HC-3.
Final Hazard Categorization
Final hazard categorization entailed comparing the radioactive inventory quantities impacted by potential bounding unmitigated accidents to the adjusted threshold quantity values (TQVs) based on those provided in DOE-STD-1027-92 for HC-2 and HC-3 facilities. Adjustment of the DOE-STD-1027-92 TQVs was performed based on the differences between inputs used in the original underlying U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) calculations and those corresponding to bounding unmitigated accidents identified for D&D activities. The factors considered were the ARF, the RF, and the DR. Accordingly, the DOE-STD-1027-92 TQVs were adjusted by the ratio of the bounding case ARF, RF, and DRs over those used in the original EPA calculations. For the KE Basin hazard categorization, ARF HC represents the product of the ARF, RF, and the DR. DOE-ID Order 420.D and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency technical background document provide the ARFs used to determine the HC-3 TQVs used in DOE-STD-1027-92.
Accident Consequences
In order to provide perspective on the hazard categorization result, dose consequences were estimated for each bounding unmitigated accident used for the hazard categorization and compared to consequence criteria in HNF-8739 for the 100-m receptor and the MOI. Radiological consequences are estimated using methodologies and parameters identified in HNF-8739 and HNF-SD-SNF-TI-059, A Discussion on the Methodology for Calculating Radiological and Toxicological Consequences for the Spent Fuel Project a the Hanford Site. Standardized factors to account for the source term, atmospheric transport factor, and the unit dose are presented. The dose calculation is based on the methodology identified in HNF-8739 and in the DOE-approved RADIDOSE model on an Excel® spreadsheet developed to evaluate radiological doses from accidents at nuclear facilities. The RADIDOSE program was not utilized for the calculation of the consequences presented in this document because of the unique inventories and release mechanisms modeled.
The calculated doses were compared to the consequence criteria in HNF-8739 and used to characterize the impact (e.g., High, Moderate, and Low) for comparison to the qualitative significance criteria in DOE-STD-1027-92.
Hazard Categorization Results
Radionuclide Inventory
The 
Initial Hazard Categorization Results
The initial hazard categorization results for the KE Basin sand filter using the isotopic data from KBC-24705, Rev. 0, indicates a HC-2 ratio of 0.045 and a HC-3 ratio of 5.3 as shown in Table 1 .
Bounding Unmitigated Accident Selection
The hazard analysis presented in Appendix B of SNF-22494 organizes hazardous conditions into accident groups. The final hazard categorization is determined based on the bounding unmitigated accident (i.e., scenario) for each accident group. Based on those results, both a seismic induced fire and a spray release while removing the sand filter media were chosen as the potential bounding accidents involving the sand filter.
4.4
Final Hazard Categorization Results
Accident Analysis: Seismic Induced Fire
The seismic induced fire accident is assessed considering the progression of D&D activities that will take place at the KE Basin. Specifically, it is expected that the sand filter will be in service until the basin is dewatered. During D&D operations the sand filter is susceptible to damage from a seismically induced fire. In addition, during sand filter media removal, the filter media, including collected sludge, could be vulnerable. It is postulated that a seismically induced fire occurs while the sand filter is in service. The fire scenario is the similar to the design basis accident that is described for the KW annular filter in HNF-SD-WM-SAR-062.
Accident Description for Seismic Induced Fire
In this scenario the sand filter vessel is exposed to a seismically induced fire. Rapid vaporization can occur as the material is heated during the fire.
Source Term Analysis for Seismic Induced Fire
Material-at-Risk
The sand filter radionuclide inventory is based on the inventory in the sand filter DQO (See Table 1 ).
Damage Ratio
A DR of 0.1 is based on the assumption that the sand filter media are wet, only a small volume of the material is directly exposed in the fire, and the sand filter media are enclosed in a robust concrete/stainless steel vessel.
Airborne Release Fraction
The ARF selected for the seismically induced fire involving sand filter media is 4.8E-04 (DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Table A -3, Experiment 22b, UO 2 on smooth sandy soil). The ARF cited is applicable for a release of heavy metals (atomic mass greater than 226) from smooth sandy soil due to the fire, and the results are applicable to a gasoline fire involving the sand filter media. A low wind speed (~2.5 mi/h) is also chosen to represent the lower dispersiblity of 95th percentile meteorology conditions.
Respirable Fraction
The RF for KE sand filter is conservatively assumed to be 1.0 because it is expected that only the fine sludge particles suspended in the basin water will be captured in the sand filter. Table 2 presents a summary of the parameters discussed above and used to determine TQV (adj) to be used in the final hazard categorization based on the seismic induced fire accident. Table 3 presents the results of the hazard categorization for the seismic induced fire accident.
Final Hazard Categorization Results for the Seismic Induced Fire
In addition to the adjustment of the TQVs from DOE-STD-1027-92 to provide the hazard categorization of the sand filter, a comparison of the estimated consequences to the criteria in HNF-PRO-700 is presented in Section 4.5 for the sand filter inventory.
Conservatisms and Uncertainties for the Seismic Induced Fire
Although other D&D scenarios may exist which more closely model D&D related activities, the seismic fire was chosen to bound any potential fire-related impacts from an accident involving the sand filter material.
Accident Analysis: Spray Release
During D&D operations the sand filter media will be removed, so the possibility exists that a spray release occurs in the line, hose or fitting used to transfer the sand filter media. It is postulated that a spray leak occurs while the sand filter media is being pumped into a container for storage or transport.
Accident Description for the Spray Release
In this scenario the sand filter vessel is opened and pumping equipment inserted. While the sand filter media is being pumped to a container a breach in the transfer line, hose or fitting occurs.
Source Term Analysis for the Spray Release
Material-at-Risk
Damage Ratio
A DR of 0.1 credits the assumption that the sand filter media plugs the slit (breach) that is created. The slit is assumed to be small enough to generate a fine spray resulted in the ARF selected. As such it will be susceptible to plugging from particles of coarse sand.
Airborne Release Fraction
The ARF is 1.61E-03 (HNF-8739) corresponding to the published ARF intended specifically for K Basin floor and canister sludge, which is the expected source term material in the sand filter.
Respirable Fraction
Although data exist to suggest that the respirable fraction for sludge is limited to 28% respirable at 10 µm (HNF-SD-SNF-TI-015, Vol. 2), that data is more applicable to floor and canister sludge. Therefore, for the sand filter media, an RF of 1.0 is assumed because it is expected that only the fine sludge particles suspended in the basin water will be captured in the sand filter. Table 4 presents a summary of the parameters discussed above and used to determine TQV (adj) to be used in the final hazard categorization based on the spray release. 
Final Hazard Categorization Results for the Spray Release
Conservatisms and Uncertainties for the Spray Release
Although other D&D scenarios may exist which more closely model D&D related activities, the spray release was chosen to bound any potential impacts from an accident involving the transfer of sand filter material.
The specific procedure for removing the sand filter media has not been finalized. However, it is assumed that spray release would bound the consequences of any method for the removal of the sand filter media.
Consequence Assessment
Analysis for the KE Basin Sand filter Seismic Induced Fire Accident Scenario Development and Description
This accident is a seismically induced fire involving the KE Basin sand filter, which releases radioactive material to the air. The consequences of that accident scenario are estimated in this section. Two types of release mechanisms occur as a result of the fire: (1) initial release due to the fire and (2) resuspension of particles after the fire.
Analysis Data and Assumptions
The assumptions used to estimate the consequences from a release from the KE Basin sand filter are listed below.
• The sludge inventory in the sand filter is estimated based on data presented in KE Basin Sand Filter Monolith DQO (KBC-24705) and in HNF-1777. A total of 430 kg of sludge is estimated. This is based on assuming that 10% of the total volume of the top layer of sand (the working media) is sludge (HNF-1777) and approximately 4300 kg of sand in the working layer (KBC-24705). The annular filter in the HNF-1777 has an outer diameter of 72 inches and a sand working depth of approximately 30 inches. The KE sand filter has an outer diameter of 78 inches and a working depth of approximately 30 inches. Therefore, the percentage of sludge in the working media was assumed to be the same.
• For purposes of calculating radiological dose consequences, the fire release is assumed to last for 1 hour and the resuspension from the fire is assumed to last for 8 hours. Therefore, the atmospheric dispersion coefficient (χ/Q') for the 100-m worker is 1.24E-02 s/m 3 , and for the MOI, it is assumed to be 3.12E-05 s/m 3 (HNF-SD-SNF-TI-059). For resuspension of 8 hours, the χ/Q values were calculated to be 7.32E-03 for the 100-m worker and 1.30E-05 for the MOI.
• The ARF is assumed to be 4.8E-04 (DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Table A-3, Experiment 22b, UO 2 on smooth sandy soil).
• Although KE Sludge is limited to 28% respirable (HNF-SD-SNF-TI-015, Spent Nuclear Fuel Databook, Volume 2, Sludge, the sand filter is not expected to be represented by KE floor or canister sludge. An RF of 1.0 was assumed because it is expected that only the fine sludge particles suspended in the basin water will be captured in the sand filter.
• The breathing rate for the 100-m worker doing light activity work is assumed to be 3.33E-04 m 3 /s, and for the offsite receptor, the same breathing rate was assumed (HNF-SD-SNF-TI-059).
• The dose conversion factor for each of the radionuclides identified in the sand filter inventory is taken from ICRP-68 for workers and ICRP-72 for the public.
• The LPF is conservatively assumed to be 1.0.
• Based on the small volume of sludge exposed, the robust nature of the sand filter vessel, and the wet media at risk, the DR is estimated to be 0.1.
• The ARR associated with resuspension of the initial release is 4E-05 based on DOE-HDBK-3010, pg 4-101. 
Airborne Source Term Released Analysis
Two types of particle release mechanisms occur as a result of the fire: (1) initial release due to the fire and (2) resuspension following the fire.
The maximum available MAR is 430 kg of sludge in the KE Basin sand filter vessel. The material released from the sand filter is assumed to collect outside the sand filter. To determine the vertical flux off the pile of material, DOE-HDBK-3010-94 provides the ARF and RF for UO 2 on sandy soil in a fire condition. The report shows an ARF of 4.8E-04 (experiment 22b).
The airborne source term is estimated using the following equation: Therefore, ST resuspension = 13.8 g.
Radiological Dose Consequence Analysis
This analysis uses the standard accepted approach for calculating the maximum radiological dose to the onsite worker and offsite individual from the source term released from an accident. For the postulated accident, the airborne pathway is of primary interest. The inhalation dose calculated is the 50-year CEDE defined as the dose received by an individual during a 50-year period following uptake. For the 100-m worker, this dose must be combined with that due to external exposure (if any) to yield the TEDE. For the postulated sand filter media accident, there is insignificant external exposure. The dose from inhalation is calculated using the following equation from HNF-SD-SNF-TI-059:
where D = dose to receptor due to inhalation (Sv) Q = respirable source term (g)
BR = breathing rate (m 3 /s) UD = inhalation unit dose (rem/g).
The atmospheric dispersion coefficient is the time-integrated normalized air concentration at the receptor. It represents the dilution of an airborne contaminant due to atmospheric mixing and turbulence. It is the ratio of the average contaminant air concentration at the receptor to the contaminant release rate at the release point. It is used to determine the dose consequences for a receptor based on the quantity released, atmospheric conditions, and the distance to the receptor of interest.
The BR is the average volume of air an individual breathes in every second. The inhalation unit dose is the dose that the individual receives from inhalation of every unit of respirable source term. The unit dose is 4.10E+02 rem/g CEDE for the 100-m worker and 1.30E+03 for the MOI. Similarly, the dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual is calculated as 3.7E-04 rem.
Analysis Conservatisms and Uncertainties for the Seismic Induced Fire
The amount of sludge remaining in the sand filter is expected to be small since the sand filter is back flushed into the NLOP.
Seismic Induced Fire Analysis Results and Conclusions
The calculated CEDE to the 100-m worker is 4.0E-02 rem. The calculated CEDE received by the MOI (at approximately 10,000 m) is 3.7E-04 rem. The results of this accident are well below the 25 rem 100-m worker guidelines and 1 rem offsite receptor limits for Low consequences as defined by HNF-PRO-700.
Analysis for the KE Basin Sand filter Spray Release Accident Scenario Development and Description
The spray release accident was chosen to estimate the bounding consequences associated with removal of the sand filter media. The consequences of that accident scenario are estimated in this section. Two types of release mechanisms occur as a result of the spray release: (1) initial spray release and (2) resuspension of material after the spray.
Analysis Data and Assumptions
The assumptions used to estimate the consequences of a release from the KE Basin sand filter are listed below.
• For purposes of calculating radiological dose consequences, the spray is assumed to last for less than 1 hour and resuspension is assumed to last for 8 hours. Therefore, for the spray release, the atmospheric dispersion coefficient (χ/Q') for the 100-m worker is 7.32E-02 s/m 3 , and for the MOI, it is 4.49E-05 s/m 3 (HNF-SD-SNF-TI-059). For the resuspension release, the atmospheric dispersion coefficient (χ/Q') for the 100-m worker was calculated to be 7.321E-03 s/m 3 , and for the MOI, it is assumed to be 1.30E-05 s/m 3 (HNF-SD-SNF-TI-059).
• The ARF is assumed to be 1.61E-03 (HNF-8739).
• Although KE Sludge is limited to 28% respirable (HNF-SD-SNF-TI-015, Spent Nuclear Fuel Databook, Volume 2, Sludge, the sand filter is not expected to be represented by KE floor or canister sludge. Therefore, an RF of 1.0 was assumed because it is expected that only the fine sludge particles suspended in the basin water will be captured in the sand filter.
• The ARR associated with resuspension of the initial release is 4E-05 based on DOE-HDBK-3010, pg 4-101. It is conservatively assumed that the initial spray release has dried. • The average inhalation or BR for the 100-m worker doing light activity work is assumed to be 3.33E-04 m3/s, and for the offsite receptor, the same value is used (HNF-SD-SNF-TI-059).
• The DF for each of the radionuclides identified in the sand filter inventory is taken from ICRP-68 for workers and ICRP-72 for the public.
• Based on the expected plugging of the spray leak with the sand filter media and the wet media at risk, the DR is estimated to be 0.1.
• Dose per unit respirable radioactive material inhaled is estimated as 4.1E+02 rem/g for the 100-m worker and 1.3E+03 rem/g for the MOI (SNF-19460, Accident Analysis for Sludge & Water System Operations in the 105 KE Basin North Loadout Pit).
Airborne Source Term Released Analysis
Two types of particle release mechanisms occur as a result of the spray release: (1) initial release due to the spray and (2) resuspension following the spray. For the spray release, the resuspension release following the spray would be insignificant compared to the initial release.
The airborne source term is estimated using the following equation: The ARR is the coefficient used to estimate the rate at which the radioactive material is resuspended in air as a result of atmospheric conditions. The RT is the time period over which resuspension can occur.
The airborne source term resulting from the resuspension of spray release is calculated below:
ST resuspension = (4.3E+05g) x 0.1 x 4E-05 x 1.0 x 1.0 x 8.0 ST resuspension = 13.8 grams.
Radiological Dose Consequence Analysis
where, D = dose to receptor due to inhalation (Sv) Q = respirable source term (g) ' Q χ = atmospheric dispersion coefficient (s/m3) BR = breathing rate (m 3 /s) UD = inhalation unit dose (rem/g).
The BR is the average volume of air an individual breathes in every second. The inhalation unit dose is the dose that the individual receives from inhalation of every unit of respirable source term. The unit dose is 4.10E+02 rem/g CEDE for the 100-m worker and 1.30E+03 for the MOI. The dose from inhalation due to the initial release to the 100-m worker can be calculated as follows: The total dose to the 100-m onsite worker is:
6.9E-01 + 1.0E-02 = 7.0E-01 rem
The total dose to the MOI is:
1.3E-03 + 7.8E-05 = 1.4E-03 rem
Analysis Conservatisms and Uncertainties for the Spray Release
Although other deactivation and decommissioning scenarios may exist which more closely model deactivation and decommissioning-related activities, the spray was chosen to bound any potential impacts from an accident involving the removal of the sand filter media.
The equipment used to remove the sand filter media has not been determined. Further analysis may be warranted of the spray release when details on the method to remove the media are available.
Spray Release Analysis Results and Conclusions
The calculated CEDE to the 100-m worker is 0.7 rem. The calculated CEDE received by the MOI (at approximately 10,000 m) is 1.4E-03 rem. The results of this accident are below the 25 rem 100-m worker guidelines and 1 rem offsite receptor limits for Low consequences as defined by HNF-PRO-700.
Conclusions
The KE sand filter radionuclide data contained in KE Basin Sand Filter Monolith DQO (KBC-24705) indicates an initial hazard categorization of HC-3. Considering the bounding accidents that can cause a release of the sand filter media, the KE Basin sand filter contribution to the hazard categorization ratio is 0.8. Considering other radioactive materials in the basin, the sand filter media would need to be removed to allow consideration of categorizing the KE Basin as less than hazard category 3 after fuel and sludge are removed. Further, the predicted consequences of the maximum credible unmitigated release from the sand filter do not to have any significant localized consequences according to the DOE-STD-1027-92 qualitative consequence criteria and fall in the Low category according to 
